But in the present state of psychology and physiology, belief in immortality can, at any rate, claim no support from science, and such arguments as are possible on the subject point to the probable extinction of personality at death.

-- Bertrand Russell, "Religion and Science"

Defining the Problem

Is there life after death? This question has been asked since the dawn of civilization. It is arguably the most important and most personal question that can be asked in light of the realization of one's own mortality. Immortality is a complex issue dependent on several other philosophical questions which need to be addressed. A fundamental prerequisite for addressing the issue of immortality is to set the problem within its proper context.

Corliss Lamont defines immortality as

The literal survival of the individual human personality or consciousness for an indefinite period after [physical] death, with its memory and awareness of self-identity essentially intact (Lamont 22).

An essential fundamental distinction is the difference between survival of bodily death and immortality. Survival implies only the continued existence of the personality after the physical death of the body without specifying whether that existence is eternal or eventually leads to annihilation (Edwards, "Introduction" 2). Although arguments have been advanced which attempt to prove the indestructibility and hence immortality of the soul (e.g. Plato), these are not the concern of this essay. Nor are potential problems with the notion of eternal existence addressed. The concern of this essay is, however, the logical possibility of and evidence for or against survival of bodily death. Arguments for survival establish nothing in favor of immortality; however, arguments against survival are arguments against immortality. In other words, immortality presupposes the possibility of survival. This also means that any evidence deemed from parapsychology serves only as evidence for survival (2). This essay will not discuss ethical arguments which attempt to establish immortality as a necessary consequent of the benevolence of an omnipotent God. This line of argument would divert us from the present topic of this paper and bring out arguments about the existence and nature of God which are beyond the scope of this essay. Rather, the arguments analyzed here will be either of a philosophical or empirical nature.

There are two fundamental positions on the question of immortality. The survival hypothesis asserts that the human personality will continue to exist in some form after the death of the physical body. The extinction hypothesis contends that the human personality will permanently extinguish after the death of the body. This distinction may seem redundant and obvious, but the necessity of this precise definition will become clear when we analyze survival theories which invoke temporary extinction. I will assume that the burden of proof falls on the survival hypothesis because in our daily lives we know of the existence of the personality only in association with the living physical organism; that is, conclusive evidence for the continued existence of the personality after the death of the physical body does not exist for any of the views I will analyze.

Another important distinction is the difference between personal and impersonal forms of survival. Personal survival means that people will survive bodily death as distinct individuals. An example of impersonal survival would be the Buddhist belief in nirvana as a kind of Absolute Mind that individual minds merge or are absorbed into when enlightenment is fully realized (Edwards, "Introduction" 2-3). This essay will focus exclusively on personal survival.

There are three "vehicles" for the survival of the personality after the death of the body that will be considered: the disembodied mind, the astral body, and resurrection. These vehicles can be used alone or in combination. A disembodied mind is an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes a person's mental states--a "soul". The astral body is a form of exotic matter, for in its most fundamental sense it refers to a spatial entity which has physical characteristics such as shape, size, and spatial position. These criteria must be met to distinguish the astral body from the disembodied mind. The astral body is consequently detectable in principle but extremely difficult to detect in practice--otherwise it would be noticed leaving the body at death or perhaps during out-of-body experiences. The astral body can also be specifically envisioned as mirroring the physical body's features.

Resurrection of the body is an overt miracle from God in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradition and thus presupposes the truth of traditional monotheism. Thus, as Kai Nielsen points out, "if the grounds for believing in God are scant the grounds for believing in bodily resurrection are doubly scant" (Nielsen 238). This point is relevant because arguments against the existence of God are decisive arguments against resurrection; but arguments of this sort are not my present concern. To isolate resurrection as a vehicle for survival I will assume a version of resurrection which posits the extinction of the personality at death and its re-creation with a resurrection of the body. Resurrection can be conceived of in two forms: the literal resurrection of the decayed corpse or the creation of a new body or "replica". It should be noted that there can be no empirical evidence in support of resurrection if it is taken to be a future event on Earth or an event that takes place in another world.

Immortality is related to the mind-body problem and the problem of personal identity in philosophy. The mind-body problem is concerned with how the mind and body are related to each other. Many theories have been proposed to solve the mind-body problem. Modern materialism contends that mental states are reducible to physical brain states. Thus, if materialism is true, survival in the form of disembodied minds or astral bodies is ruled out automatically. Epiphenomenalism, which contends that the mind is a separate yet dependent by-product of the brain, has the same implications for survival. Resurrection is compatible with both of these theories of mind. A dualism that contends that the mind is a separate, independent entity from the brain is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of disembodied minds or astral bodies (Edwards, "Dependence" 292). Resurrection is consistent with dualism if it is coupled with the notion of a soul which constitutes the personality and thus does not extinguish with the body at death but continues to exist and is later rejoined to a resurrected body (Flew, "God" 108). Personal identity is concerned with what makes a person the same person over time. Personal identity problems will arise in the context of specific arguments about the logical possibility of immortality.

The Philosophical Case Against Immortality

Immortality has primarily been an issue discussed among philosophers. Thus, in analyzing the case for the permanent extinction of the personality at death, it is convenient to address the philosophical arguments before looking at the scientific evidence for annihilation. Logical arguments, if successful, are decisive; thus, not even an appeal to faith could vindicate a belief that is incoherent because no one would understand what it is that one claims to believe. The extinction hypothesis is supported by the conceptual problems that plague the notions of disembodied minds, astral bodies, and resurrection.

Belief in survival in the form of disembodied minds presupposes that people possess an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes the personality. One objection to this view, that human beings are essentially corporeal, is stated by Corliss Lamont:

If we carefully examine their accounts, we find that... they actually provide this spirit with a body... [T]heir descriptions give to it activities, functions, and environments usually pertaining to earthly existence and natural bodies. The immortal personality... enjoys and suffers a great many experiences that would simply be impossible without the cooperation of... the body (Lamont 46).

Gardner Murphy illustrates this point when he asks us "to try... to imagine what his personal existence would be like if he were deprived of every device for making contact with his environment" (Edwards, "Introduction" 47). Antony Flew gives an excellent example of our corporeal nature:

Consider... how you would teach the meaning of any person word to a child. This is done... by some sort of direct or indirect pointing at members of that very special class of living physical objects to which we one and all belong (Flew, "God" 111).

Thus, to quote John Hospers: "Your body seems to be involved in every activity we try to describe even though we have tried to imagine existing without it" (Hospers 280).

This brings up an interesting point. Even if you conceded the possibility of disembodied existence, you would still have to justify the identification of the disembodied spirit with the previously "flesh and blood" person. C. D. Broad makes the point:

If I cannot clearly conceive what it would be like to be an unembodied person, I find it almost incredible that the experiences of such a person... could be sufficiently continuous with those had in his lifetime by any deceased human being as to constitute together the experiences of one and the same person (Broad 278).

Many philosophers have argued the bodily continuity is more essential to personal identity than memory because memory claims c